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THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS OF 
WATER DEMAND MANAGEMENT: ALL 
DRESSED UP AND NOWHERE TO GO 
John E. Keith 
ABSTRACT 
Economists have advocated efficient use of water resources through the demand 
management tool of marginal cost (including opportunity cost) pricing policies for several 
decades, using increasingly sophisticated models to point out the welfare gains of this policies. 
More recently, water markets have become de rigueur in many articles, books and texts as a way 
to "automatically" include both delivery and opportunity costs. 
A review of the experience in both the developed and developing world, however, 
suggests that the adoption of these policies has been infrequent at best, particularly for irrigated 
agriculture. The objective of this paper is to review existing demand management activities in 
many countries, including the U.S., and to try to provide some understanding of the failure of 
water management agencies to employ these tools. 
Water subsidies for agricultural water are found in many developed countries, such as the 
United States, and widely among developing countries, even when water is in critically short 
supply. Most papers and reports describing the application of marginal cost pricing and/or water 
markets, the same few references appear over and over (Chile, Israel, and Australia, for 
example). Many authors suggest that the reason for the widespread absence of full marginal cost 
pricing and/or water markets lies in the rent seeking behavior of current beneficiaries and the 
inertia in water management systems. 
While these barriers are important, technical and institutional difficulties also playa 
critical role, especially in irrigated agriculture. Based on examples from many countries, it is 
clear that water measurement at the user level does not exist and that it will be costly to 
implement and maintain, reducing the ability of managers to apply efficient pricing. Moreover, 
creating water (use) rights also requires some form of water control and measurement at the user 
level. For systems with many very small farmers, the problem is multiplied substantially. 
Institutional barriers also are difficult to overcome. Some of these barriers, such as reluctant 
administrations and powerful lobbies, reflect, at least in part, the kind of rent-seeking and inertia 
economists (and others) often point out. Some involve the economic reality of long-term 
leasehold interest and consequent large losses of investment value. Some are related to 
institutions other than those for water, such as insecure and/or fragmented land tenure. Still 
others are cultural and social, and represent a broad consensus of society, rather than specific 
beneficiary groups. The many examples of the institutional and technical difficulties suggest that 
as demand management increasingly becomes the rhetoric of water economists, and the water 
management community in general, finding workable solutions to the those problems is 
absolutely essential if efficient water pricing and water markets are to be implemented. 
IV 
Introduction 
Many economic researchers and practitioners have written on the subject of optimal 
water allocations and water pricing. The criteria for economic efficiency are clear: supply 
equals demand or marginal costs equal marginal benefits equal price. Of course, various 
constraints can affect these conditions - for example, the existence of externalities, common 
property and public good characteristics, and economies of scope and scale. Still, there are 
volumes of scholarly books and articles which deal with these problems and basically reach the 
same conclusion. As a highly respected, University of Chicago-trained professor of mine once 
put it: economic efficiency (and therefore public welfare maximization) is achieved by equating 
at the margin in all directions. 
The current literature in water economics focuses mainly on three issues: water markets, 
water pricing, and pollution. The latter topic is extremely critical without doubt. However, this 
paper will focus on quantity aspects of water allocation and only briefly touch on quality 
problems. The title of this paper suggests the following: Economists and economic analyses 
have proven themselves capable of identifying the benefits to individuals and societies which 
arise from the establishment of water markets and, in the absence of full markets, have estimated 
the appropriate tariffs on water which would achieve economics efficiency. Unfortunately, the 
long history of economic analysis is not accompanied by a similarly long history of the 
development of water markets or the application of optimal, economically efficient tariffs. This 
paper attempts to suggest reasons why the failure to implement these economic tools of demand 
management seems so ubiquitous. The author does not claim originality. Most of the 
observations have been made elsewhere. Yet, it seems that in a conference on Water Demand 
Management, attention should be focused to some degree on the obstacles to these effective 
economic policies. 
For the most part, water demand management (quantity) issues focus on irrigation for 
several reasons. First, irrigation reflects an insufficient quantity of rainfall to produce viable 
crops, so that agricultural production depends on some kind of development activity. Second, 
once in place, irrigation usually consumes at least a majority - and most often a great majority-
of the developed water. Third, agriculture is generally speaking the least valuable use of water; 
that is to say, the net value of crops is usually small relative to other uses (municipal, industrial) 
per unit of water consumed. Finally, agriculture is usually granted significant water subsidies in 
the form of little or no charges for water compared to other users. Thus, economic analyses of 
efficient water use and demand management usually target shifts of water use from low valued 
agriculture to higher valued uses. 
Water Markets 
Much of the "new water demand management economics" is focused on the development 
of water markets, for clear theoretical reasons, as Hutchins, R. L. Anderson, Gardner and 
Fullerton, and Charles W. Howe, et al. all pointed out early literature (1930-1970) on potential 
water markets in the West. Individuals and firms trading water based on its value and cost 
should reach a solution in which economic efficiency is achieved. No one will pay more than the 
value of additional water to him or her; no one will sell additional water for less than it costs him 
or her. Water will be transferred at the margin from low valued uses to high valued uses 
automatically. Water sources will only be developed if the benefits of the additional water are 
greater than or equal to the costs of provision. Finally, any water transfer is accompanied by a 
"fair" compensation for the loss of the right to the seller - a "win-win" situation. 
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Many authors (Gardner and Fullerton; Anderson and Snyder; Wahl, 1986 and 1989; 
Easter and Hearne; to name just a few) have discussed the value of market transfers in allocating 
water resources, the economic costs inherent in the failure to allocate efficiently, and the 
impediments to free transfers. In much of the water market literature, the same examples appear: 
the American West, Chile, Spain, and East Asia (India and Bangladesh). The examples from the 
Western United States are relatively numerous. Some are based on transfers from low value to 
high value agricultural water users within a canal company (water user association) or other 
institutional entity. Some are based on exchanges between irrigators (usually represented by 
canal companies) and municipal or industrial users. Others involve sales of water to various 
types of users within a water management agency (such as the Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District). Still others represent water leasing arrangements in times of drought. In 
Chile, water sales from users and user organizations to municipal users are noted. Even though 
these examples demonstrate gains from trade and markets in water rights, the markets are often 
confined to relatively small areas and trading is limited. 
Since markets seem so attractive as an allocation mechanism, why are there only a few 
examples of working water markets evidenced around the world? Failure to implement markets 
has most often been laid at the feet of rent seeking users and government administrators (see, for 
example, Anderson and Snyder). But is that a sufficient critique of how few water markets have 
developed or encouraged? 
As many authors (including Reidinger, Schleyer, Cummings and Nercesiantz, Simpson 
and Berkoff - all found in Le Moigne, et al) point out, markets require several specific 
conditions to be effective. First, some form of water right must be allocated to individuals and/or 
organizations. Those "rights" must include the three attributes generally recognized in the 
economic literature: the right to use, the right to transfer, and the ability to exclude others. As a 
part of this institutional framework, recourse to recognized and consistent authority must be 
provided such that these rights may be defended. In addition, quantification and measurement 
are a necessary condition for rights to be assigned or transferred. Finally, for market to be 
efficient, consideration of external effects must be considered. 
In almost all nations, water is regarded as a property of the State and the "right" to the 
water resource belongs to the government. Within the examples of water markets which have 
been presented in the literature, the form of the water right varies substantially, but in almost all 
cases, it is a "usufructory" right - that is, a "right" is granted to use a certain allocation of water, 
subject to a set of conditions (among which is the recognition of the State's ownership of water). 
These rights may be "appropriative" (such as found in the Western United States), where the 
amount and priority for diversion are granted by the State government (not the Federal 
government). One comment often heard is that most of the surface water in the Western US is 
"over-appropriated" - that is, the amount of water rights granted exceeds the average water 
production for the specified area. The priority serves to allocate water. During scarcity, higher 
priority rights are able to divert water whereas lower priority rights are not. During periods of 
high water production, the lower priority rights can gain access. As a result, markets in water 
rights discount low priorities, as should be the case. In Chile, the allocated rights are 
distinguished in priority by general characteristics (classes). However, the government retains 
the right to withdraw or reallocate water rights in times of water scarcity. In other cases, water 
"rights" are stated in the form of delivery contracts or agreements (the water companies in the 
Western United States are an example). The certainty of the right (contract) depends upon the 
contract conditions, and transfers of water rights or contracts may be constrained by those 
conditions. A good discussion of this approach in the Western US can be found in Wahl (1989). 
In Morocco, the newly created River Basin Agencies are charged with providing authorizations 
for the use of surface and ground water. These authorizations, however, are granted for 5 to 20 
years (renewable), and not freely transferable, so water markets would be only for temporary 
transfers, at best. Many countries follow similar patterns. 
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In many developing countries, water "rights" are regarded with at best suspicion. Many, 
if not most, countries view water provision and allocation as a state function. The "right" to use 
water is seldom granted, although most water managers (in Egypt, for example) see provision of 
water supply as a duty and failure to deliver the full measure of water as a potential disaster to be 
avoided if possible. In more developed countries, private or semi-private firms or agencies are 
granted a water right and a franchise to sell water to consumers. The Northern Colorado 
Conservancy District (NCCD) and the Societe du Canal de Provence in Southern France (SCP) 
are examples. However, this type of allocation mechanism frequently creates a monopoly 
supplier and the government often sets limits on the "market" price which can be charged. These 
suppliers contract with buyers based on their offer price. These are clearly markets, but not the 
competitive markets of open trading among individual owners of water rights. It should be 
noted, however, that other existing sources of water may also limit pricing to close to 
competitive levels (see Spulber, for example, for a discussion of monopoly pricing with threats 
of entry). Clearly, so long as monopoly prices are not charged, there is a gain from the trade in 
water rights. In the SCP case, a range of purchase options, which include interruptability and 
priority delivery, are given to buyers. It should be noted that, at the current prices (ranging from 
about $0.30 to $0.50 per cubic meter) only about 40% of the available SCP agricultural water is 
sold (Keith). Note that "franchising" water distribution to private firms is being considered in 
many areas, such as in the Souss Massa basin in Morocco, where water from storage is being 
contracted to a firm for delivery to areas of groundwater exhaustion (Keith and Ouattar). A large 
portion of these "franchises" are found in municipal water supply. 
The measurement of water allocations is also often impediments to broad water markets, 
especially in developing countries with many small farmers. Without a measure of the "right" 
and a measure of the amount of the sale, markets are not likely to flourish. For small systems 
with a large number of withdrawal points, measurements are very costly. There are cases of 
market-like exchanges in these systems, such as in Egypt's Fayoum region, in which water 
"turns" are exchanged although even there, there is little evidence of monetary transactions 
(Cardinelli, et al.). In most cases in which markets exist in these kinds of small farm systems, 
either the market is informal or the buying or selling agency is a water user association, rather 
than individuals. The WUA acts more or less as an agent of water users in negotiating water 
transfers outside of the internal exchanges which might occur. Again, most of these "markets" 
exist within a small region or project. 
The protection of third parties in market structures - at least with respect to quantity - is 
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a function of the right itself. Some rights are granted with respect to consumptive use, some with 
respect to withdrawals or diversions. Since the latter normally involve return flows to surface or 
ground water, trades in rights must secure access to other rights holders. In either case, 
knowledge about the return flows is necessary before the water right can be firmly established, 
which requires measurement and studies. In many cases, this knowledge is lacking. There is a 
significant literature in the U.S. arguing that water markets do not protect third parties and may 
diminish, rather than improve, social welfare (Brown and Ingram and Mumme and Ingram, for 
example). Moreover, social values in many countries, including but not limited to Muslim 
countries, seem opposed to the granting of water rights. It is true that this "social" position is 
often espoused by the government water managers (perhaps fearful of losing control of a 
valuable political resource, which would certainly be rent-seeking), but my experience over 30 
years of water research and policy analysis, anecdotal though it is, suggests that the mistrust of 
granting water rights is relatively widespread, probably due at least in part to non-transparency 
of government actions in water management and other arenas. Note, for example, that even 
where water markets seem relatively abundant in several Western US states, those states have 
denied water right owners the ability to trade or transfer out of the state boundaries in fear of 
losing some future potential economic development within the state. 
Clearly, water markets do represent an alternative allocation method which can achieve 
economic efficiency. But most developing countries must be willing to change the way in which 
they view and manage water "ownership" before markets can immerge. Some options - such as 
tradable delivery contracts - may offer a way around mistrust of full water use rights, but limited 
rights also mean limited gains in efficient. In any event, without the institutional structures -
technical (measurement) and legal (rights) - it is highly doubtful that water markets will assume 
a major role in water allocation, and that these markets will continue to be locally confined and 
relatively undeveloped. To repeat, water markets are the exception in the world, rather than the 
rule. Thus, I tum to the pricing of water by government, quasi-government, or private utilities. 
Water Pricing 
If the economic literature on water markets is large, the literature on optimal water 
pricing is enormous. Pricing at marginal cost - including opportunity cost - has been examined 
in many countries. The literature for the Western U.S. case spans many decades. Critiques of 
water pricing and subsidies in U.S. federal projects can be found in almost any academic journal 
related to natural resource management. Operations research models of optimal water 
allocations (and the optimal shadow prices of water) abound and a list of references from highly 
respected researchers is very long indeed, including such names as Charles W. Howe, B. 
Delworth Gardner, Robert A. Young, and Oscar R. Burt in the 1960s and 1970s up to Ariel 
Dinar, Yakov Tsur, David Zilberman in the last two decades,just to name a few. The record in 
optimal pricing - particularly for agriculture - is dismal. 
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"The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms," edited by Ariel Dinar (Dinar, ed.) 
reports work from many authors relative to the theory and practice of the implementation of 
optimal water pricing. In his first chapter, he presents his and others (Ahmed and various 
publications of the OECD in 1998 and 1999) examinations of water pricing throughout the world 
(Table 1). There seem to me to be two striking features of these comparisons: First, there are 
relatively few countries charging a volumetric delivery fee to agriculture which might be 
expected to approximate cost recovery. Those countries are, by and large, Northern European, 
with the addition of Israel and Tanzania. Their prices are generally between 0.10 and 0.50 per 
cubic meter. 1 The remainder (including the United States) appear likely to be below-cost 
charges (or no charges, which is the case in most North African and Middle Eastern countries), 
and range from $0.001 to $0.04 per cubic meter. The second observation, also in general, is that 
water tariffs for municipal and industrial users are significantly (orders of magnitude) higher 
than irrigation charges. Of course, delivered potable water would be expected to be more costly 
than irrigation water. However, there is also agreement that potable water charges, particularly 
in developing countries, also are below cost. 
Dinar's book is an essential reference for anyone interested in the problems of 
implementing optimal water prices. While I don't wish to review the presentations (and they are 
better off read in the original) there seems to me to be a general agreement that water pricing 
reform is a complex issue, involving political and institutional, as well as technical, aspects. The 
impetus for reform appears to come from either a crisis (or near crisis) in the form of drought, 
growing demand far exceeding supply, physical and/or financial failure of the delivery system, 
or from outside forces (such as the World Bank or other donors). It should be noted that several 
pricing structures are discussed in this book, and none appear to be completely transparent. The 
success of reform depends on many factors, among which Dinar lists institutional constraints, 
political constraints and the development of support or opposition, and redistribution of wealth. 
These are, of course, inter-linked. Again, according to Dinar, successful reform requires careful 
Country Agriculture Domestic Industrial 
Fixed Variable Fixed cost Variable Fixed Variable 
cost cost (cubic (household cost cost Cost 
(ha or meter) per yr or (cubic (plant (cubic 




7.59 .019-.022 0.57-.27 4.64 
Australia 0.75-
2.27 0.0195 9-162 .23-.54 7.82 
Austria .36-.98 0.85 
Belgium 2.06-2.47 
Botswana .28-1.48 
Brazil 3.5 .004-.032 0.4 
Canada 6.62- .0017-
36.7 .0019 .34-1.36 .17-1.52 
1 The reported cost for irrigation water in Turkey is $12.00 to $80.00 per cubic meter, which seems improbable. 
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Czech Republic 0.68 
Denmark 0.71 3.18 
Egypt .07-.09 .12-.59 
Finland 2.76 
France .11-.39 .36-2.58 .36-2.16 
Germany 2.69 1.02-3.70 
Greece 92-210 .02-.08 1.14 
Hungary 0.82 
India 0.16-
27.5 0.82 .0095-.08 5.49 .136-.29 
Israel .16-.26 0.36 0.26 
Italy 21 -
78.2 .14-.82 
Japan 246 1.56 





11.3 .075-.25 .32-1.75 
Mexico 33-60 .08-.35 
Namibia 53 .004-.028 1.54-4.28 .22-1.38 
Netherlands 3.16 .57-1.71 
New 6.8-
Zealand 16.6 16 - 164 .31-.69 
Pakistan 1.5-5.8 .25-1.63 .06-.10 .38-.97 
Portugal 8.86-
.009-.019 4.46-1937 .15-.53 2705 1.19 
Saudi Arabia .04-1.07 
Spain .0004- .0004-
1.0-165 .0001-.028 .005 .005 
Sudan 4.7- 1.67-
11.2 1.67-3.33 .08-.10 3.33 .08-.10 
Switzerland .33-1.96 1.29 
Syria 50 3.21 .11-.53 0.71 
Taiwan 23-214 .25-.42 
Tanzania .26-.40 .06-.24 .26-.40 
Tunisia .02-.08 .096-.53 0.58 
Turkey 12.-80. 




Yemen .02-1.45 .10-13.79 .10-13.7 
Table 1. Water prices by selected countries (taken from Dinar) 
planning, the existence of some institutional framework, a cadre of political support sufficient to 
achieve the reform, and most likely patience. 
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My own anecdotal evidence (as well as evidence from many other authors) suggests 
some additional cautions. First, where delivery systems are deteriorated due to failure of 
maintenance, it is highly unlikely that farmers will be willing to pay for water deliveries. In 
most of these cases, deliveries are uncertain at best, or completely absent. Setting a tariff equal 
to cost recovery is not likely to bring participation. A clear example is that of the Aral Sea 
Basin. Farmers in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic are levied costs of which 
they pay 20 to 40 percent. Interestingly enough, the range of delivery of water is approximately 
the same percentages, since the water systems in those areas are mostly non-functional (or was at 
the end of the 20th Century). Thus, water pricing at even cost recovery levels will not likely 
succeed unless the system is operational. 
As another example, in their chapter in Dinar's book, Diao and Roe report potential 
impacts of agricultural reform (as likely with the just concluded free trade agreement) in 
Morocco. Large losses are expected for farmers growing soft and hard wheat, particularly those 
who irrigate. Since water is priced far below cost (and often not priced at all in the case of 
groundwater), these losses appear as wealth and income losses to the farmers. A market for 
water rights would permit those farmers to substantially reduce these losses by selling water 
rights to growers of crops more profitable on the world market, such as citrus and vegetables. 
How far has the Moroccan government advanced in the 10 years since the "new" water law was 
passed allowing river basin water management agencies to provide appropriations of water and 
charge for both surface and ground water? Very little distance indeed. There is almost no 
discussion of water markets among water management agencies at the basin or national level, 
and to date water charges remain much below costs. Moreover, agricultural interests were able 
to negotiate a 15 to 20 year phasing-in period for agricultural reform in cereal grains. Clearly, 
change comes slowly in agriculture and seemingly even more slowly in water. 
The Moroccan example also illustrates a second problem in water pricing reform. It is 
very difficult to develop support for the reduction in water subsidies to agriculture (or other 
sectors, for that matter), when trading partners provide those same subsidies. Given that the U.S. 
subsidizes water for irrigation of many cereals - rice and wheat, for example - the argument that 
the Moroccan government should implement water pricing reform can not be very appealing. 
Clearly, reducing water subsidies to Moroccan farmers will make them worse off - either 
reducing their income or reducing their competitive position, or both. No wonder that water 
pricing reform is a very slow process. Until developed nations begin to phase out water 
subsidies to agriculture, it will be very hard to convince developing nations to do so. 
Another example is that of Egypt. First, water pricing is not accepted by most 
agricultural water users. Moreover, the system of delivery is such that water deliveries must be 
on a rotational basis (with the possible exception of the Fayoum example above). Measurement 
of water deliveries occurs at the secondary or tertiary canal level, and not at the farm level. A 
single rotation to a tertiary canal may serve hundreds of farmers. Water is delivered from the 
tertiary canals to local canals from which farmers pump or divert (although some farmers pump 
directly from the tertiary canals as well). The only technically feasible solution is to charge for 
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water delivery to water user associations based on the measurable delivery point. Thus, in order 
to manage demand using economic tools, the water user association would have to assess each 
farmer according to his or her water offtake. Clearly, monitoring that offtake is expensive, and it 
is quite possible that these transactions costs exceed the value of the conserved water. Further, 
the aggregation of land into larger farms poses social problems unless alternative employment 
opportunities exist (a so-called "balanced development" approach). In fact, in Egypt policies are 
in place to distribute population to the countryside (on 5 hectare plots) in order to reduce further 
urban growth. 
Another technical problem is evident with small landholders in many countries (Egypt 
and Morocco, for example). Often, administrative processes for changing land titles are so 
cumbersome that recorded titles are not clear. In other cases, such as Morocco, dividing land 
into smaller and smaller parcels (generation by generation) is legally constrained by a minimum 
size regulation, so what titles exist are not registered to the current owner. One of the suggested 
benefits of increasing water prices is the inducement to employ modem water saving 
technologies (drip and sprinkler irrigation, for example). Small landholders are unlikely to have 
sufficient capital to participate in conversion, and, moreover, lending agencies are unlikely to 
treat land without clear title as collateral. Aggregation of small farms is also constrained without 
clear titles. 
One of the primary issues in water management in Egypt is high-water using crops (such 
as rice or sugar cane). If high water-using crops are grown on a substantial portion of the canal, 
the number of rotations is increased. The volume of delivery to the tertiary canal, however, is 
not adjusted incrementally by volume. Facing the difficult task of monitoring off-takes, many 
have suggested placing a water surcharge on rice and sugar cane production (this has also been 
suggested more broadly in the literature as an alternative when volumetric pricing is not 
possible). These kinds of water demand management tools may be less than efficient 
themselves. First, the water demand effect is binary - either the tax is enough to dissuade the 
production of the crop or not. If the farmer decides to grow the crop, the amount of water use is 
basically unregulated by price. Secondly, it is quite possible that the crop is high value (or high 
profit) to the farmer, in which case either the tax is ineffective in controlling water use, or it can 
result in non-optimal farmer decisions. Maximizing "crop per drop" as an objective is not 
necessarily economically efficient. Maximizing net value per drop (as a residual claimant) may 
be. 
Dinar points out that the issue of compensation is critical to finding support for demand 
management. Water subsidies which have arisen from low or no water price are captured in the 
value of other fixed assets (usually land) in the form of lease-hold interest. Increasing water 
prices reduces income and asset value of those fixed resources without compensation. The 
reduction in welfare will galvanize affected water users to oppose the increases in tariffs. The 
beauty of water rights markets is that compensation is automatic (and negotiated). As Dinar 
notes, informing the public and developing a base of support for tariff increases is essential. 
Before concluding, Table 2 presents the past and projected water demand for the Middle 
Eastern countries, as developed by the ESCW A secretariat of the U.N. Domestic and industrial 
demands increase substantially, as might be expected from a region with growing populations. 
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However, the most striking numbers are the increases in agricultural demand. In a very water 
short region, with increasing high value pressure on water supplies, EVERY SINGLE 
COUNTRY projected a substantial increase in agricultural water use. Forecasts of increasing 
future agricultural water use can be found for almost every country listed today as extremely 
water short by the F AO (plus most other countries as well). These projections suggest to me that 
advocates of water demand management have a very difficult task ahead. 
Country 1990 2025 
Domestic Industrial Agriculture Domestic Industrial Agriculture 
Bahrain 86 17 120 230 73 271 
Egypt 2,700 4,600 49,700 6,300 10.9 69,100 
Iraq 3,800 1,450 45,200 4,750 3,560 66,000 
Jordan 190 43 650 750 175 1,090 
Kuwait 295 8 80 1,100 160 140 
Lebanon 310 60 750 1,100 450 2,581 
Oman 81 5 1,150 630 350 1,500 
Qatar 76 9 109 230 50 205 
Saudi 
Arabia 1,508 192 14,600 6,450 1,450 16,300 
Syria 650 146 6,930 3,070 2,300 22,900 
UAB 513 27 950 1,100 50 2,050 
Palestine 78 7 140 800 70 420 
Yemen 168 31 2,700 840 137 3,800 
Table 2. Estimated water demand by country (millions of cubic meters) taken from United 
Nations. 
Conclusions 
Unfortunately, the conclusions which I draw from the literature and from my own 
observations are that, in spite of the benefits which result from economically managing water 
demand, the likelihood of massive use of the tools in the near future is not high in most 
countries. Water markets offer a first-best solution (assuming third party effects are controlled), 
but require recognition by governments of some form of water right and the ability to measure 
water exchanges reasonably accurately. Institutional changes such as the provision of water 
rights and markets are slow to develop unless some external force is applied. Water pricing 
reform is also problematic, in that losers are very likely to vigorously oppose it, particularly 
when the prices applied are not transparent. Although economists and water managers must look 
to water demand management as an allocation tool, given that water supply augmentation is 
become more limited, we should not expect the implementation of demand management to be 
easy or quick. Patient explanations, careful institutional change and development, and 
cognizance of the income and wealth distribution impacts will be necessary. 
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